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CPLR 3103: Examination of defendant allowed.
Under CPA § 300, an examination before trial of a resident
party could be conducted on notice only in the county wherein the
party resided, or wherein he had an office for the regular trans-
action of business in person. A court order was required to examine
a party in any other location.41 Its successor, CPLR 3110, modifies
prior law by providing that a party may also be examined, on
notice, in the county where the action is pending -a court order
is no longer required. If this increased choice of locations imposes
a severe inconvenience upon the party to be examined, he may
move for a protective order under CPLR 3103 to stay the
examination.
In Dworsky v. Bennett,42 the plaintiff, a resident of Schenectady
County, New York, brought an action to recover damages resulting
from a motor vehicle accident which occurred near Naples, New
York. Defendant, a resident of Naples, moved for a protective
order under CPLR 3103 (a) to prevent his deposition from being
taken in Schenectady. In denying the defendant's motion to vacate
the notice of examination, the court stated that "it is difficult to
see . . . how the defendant will be annoyed, embarrassed or put
to unnecessary expense as a result of an examination to be held
200 miles from his home." 43
CPLR 3122: Failure to timely seek a protective order.
CPLR 3122 provides that a party may serve a notice of
motion for a protective order within five days of being served with
a discovery and inspection notice under CPLR 3120 or an examin-
ation notice under CPLR 3121. However, it is not specified
whether a party will be prejudiced if a protective order is sought
after the five-day period. Nor is it specified what will occur if he
first attempts to avoid disclosure when the opposing party applies
to the court to compel disclosure.44
In 1964, in Coffey v. Orbachs, Inc.,45 the appellate division,
first department, held that where a protective order was not applied
for within the five-day period of 3122, the party waived his right
to object to a 3120 discovery notice or a 3121 examination notice.
routine and assembled for transmittal to an attorney are not-by such gather-
ing and forwarding--changed in character to a thing 'created... in preparation
for litigation.' "41 Lowsley v. Uretzky, 205 Misc. 610, 613, 129 N.Y.S.2d 742, 745 (Sullivan
County Ct. 1954).
4251 Misc. 2d 383, 273 N.Y.S.2d 211 (Sup. Ct. Schenectady County 1966).
43 Dworsky v. Bennett, 51 Misc. 2d 383, 384, 273 N.Y.S2d 211, 213
(Sup. Ct. Schenectady County 1966).
4"See CPLR 3124 and 3126.
4522 App. Div. 2d 317, 254 N.Y.S.2d 596 (1st Dep't 1964).
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The court, however, limited its holding by providing that even where
a protective order was untimely moved for, "the notice to discover
the documents . . .was intended to be impliedly limited by the
provisions of CPLR 3101 (subds. [b], [c]), which respectively
make privileged matter and the work product of an attorney
unobtainable by discovery." 46 But, the court did not mention
whether material conditionally immune from disclosure under
3101(d)-material prepared for litigation-would be obtainable if
3122 were not complied with.
In Aldrich v. Catel Serv. Co.,47 it was held that where an
application for a protective order was not timely made, all
objections to disclosure were waived save those of CPLR 3101(b)
and (c). The court, after citing Coffey, stated that it was pre-
cluded "from any inquiry into the question of whether or not
such document is 'material prepared for litigation,' within the
meaning of CPLR 3101 (subd. [d])." 4
This opinion should be contrasted with Weisgold v. Kiamesha
Concord, Inc.,49 where the party seeldng a protective order also
failed to move within the time limitation of 3122. The court stated
that because of this non-compliance, he "waives his right to
object [to disclosure], but the failure to object by timely application
does not enable the adversary to secure disclosure of items CPLR
3101 excludes [i.e., subdivisions (b), (c) and (d)] .. "0
Thus, not limiting itself, as did the Aldrich court, the court then
went on to consider whether the specific matter sought to be
disclosed was immune under subdivision (d) (material prepared
for litigation).
In order to reconcile these two decisions one must examine
the applicable CPLR provisions. CPLR 3101(a) provides that
"there shall be full disclosure of all evidence material and necessary
in the prosecution or defense of an action . .. ." T~here are two
basic limitations to this edict for full disclosure. First, CPLR
3101(b), (c) and (d) provide that certain types of material
shall be immune from disclosure. The second limitation upon
disclosure, CPLR 3103(a), provides that a court may issue "a
protective order denying, limiting, conditioning or regulating the
use of any disclosure device." The section states that a protective
order "shall be designed to prevent unreasonable annoyance, expense,
embarrassment, disadvantage, or other prejudice . .. ."
The Coffey decision apparently recognized this distinction
between the limitations on disclosure imposed by 3101 and 3103
46 Coffey v. Orbachs, Inc., 22 App. Div. 2d 317, 320, 254 N.Y.S.2d 596,
599 (1st Dep't 1964).
47 51 Misc. 2d 16, 272 N.Y.S.2d 582 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct 1966).
48 Aldrich v. Catel Serv. Co., supra note 29, at 17, 272 N.Y.S2d at 584.
4 51 Misc. 2d 456, 273 N.Y.S.2d 279 (Sup. Ct. Sullivan County 1966).
50 Weisgold v. Kiamesha Concord, Inc., 51 Misc. 2d 456, 457, 273 N.Y.S.2d
279, 281 (Sup. Ct Sullivan County 1966).
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by holding that failure to move under CPLR 3122 did not waive
objections based on CPLR 3101(b) and (c). It would seem,
therefore, that since 3101(d) is part of the same provision as (b)
and (c) it should also be available as an objection to dis-
closure. It may be argued that CPLR 3101(b) and (c) can
be distinguished from (d), in that materials under (b) and (c)
are absolutely immune, while those under (d) are conditionally
immune from disclosure.51 It is submitted, however, that this
distinction does not justify a formalistic rule which causes the
automatic disclosure of some but not all material which was hereto-
fore immune from discovery. A resolution of this problem must
await further judicial interpretation.
CPLR 3130: Inclusion of negligence causes of action not a bar
to use of interrogatories on contract cause of action.
CPLR 3130 introduced to New York practice the use,
between parties, of written interrogatories.5 2  However, despite
the recommendations of the Advisory Committee,5 3 the section
as enacted does not permit interrogatories in actions to recover
damages for an injury to person or property resulting from
negligence or wrongful death. Because of this, problems have
arisen where interrogatories have been sought in actions where
negligence and contract claims have been joined.
In Ford Motor Co. v. 0. W. Burke Co.,54 the plaintiff
sought to recover damages allegedly caused as a result of floor
tile purchased and installed in plaintiff's buildings. Three causes
of action were asserted: negligence; breach of warranty; and
reckless and negligent behavior. The court held that the inclusion
of the negligence causes of action did not bar the use of inter-
rogatories relating to the contract-based cause for breach of
warranty, "at least where there exists a viable, substantial basis for
the contractually based cause and its assertion is not due solely to
artful pleading." 5s The court also stated that it would serve no
51 Material prepared for litigation (subdivision (d)) becomes obtainable
when "the court finds that the material can no longer be duplicated because
of a change in conditions and that withholding it will result in injustice or
undue hardship. . .
523 WElNSTml, KoRx & MiLLEm, Nmv YORK CrvIL cP ic 113130.01(1965).
3 Ibid.
54 51 Misc. 2d 420, 273 N.Y.S.2d 269 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1966).
56Ford Motor Co. v. 0. W. Burke Co., 51 Misc. 2d 420, 421, 273
N.Y.S.2d 269, 270 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1966). A similar conclusion was
reached in Fusco v. Enzo-Gutzeit O/Y, 42 Misc. 2d 101, 247 N.Y.S.2d 393
(Sup. Ct. Kings County 1964), where, in a maritime personal injury action,
the court permitted the defendant to serve interrogatories upon a third-party
defendant, provided the questions did not relate to the cause of action in
negligence, but were germane only to the contractual claim of breach of
warranty.
